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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
SECURITY TITLE INSURANCE
AGENCY, now known as
SECURITY TITLE
GUARANTY COMPANY, and
SECURITY TITLE
COMPANY, Utah Corporations,
Plaintiffs & Respondents,
vs.
SECURITY TITLE INSURANCE
COMPANY, a California
Corporation,
Defendant & Appellant.

Case No. 992'5

PLAINTIFFS' & RE'SPDONDENTS' REPLY TO
DEFENDANT & APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR
REHEARING AND SUPPORTING BRIEF.
INTRODUCTION
On the 31st day of December, 196'3, this Court
filed its unanimous opinion affirming the decision
of the lower Court enjoining appellant from use of
the words "Security Title" as a part of its name in
doing business in Utah. The appellant has petitiQned
this Court for rehearing and filed a brief in support
thereof. Respondents believe the appellant's petition to be without merit and, therefore, make the
following reply thereto.
1
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ARGUMENT
.NPPELLANT'S PETITION FOR R E H E A R I N G
STATES NO NEW FACTS OR GROUNDS FOR A REVERSAL OF THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT
AND IS MAINLY A RE-ARGUMENT OF THE CASE.
THE PE'TITION FOR REHEARING SHOU1JD BE DENIElD.

Appell:ant sets out two points upon which it
bases its claim of entitlement to rehearing. Both
mark a change in emphasis in the appellant's position. N ei'ther sets out anything new. The continual
shifting of position by appellant throughout the
course of this trial and :appeal is reminiscent of the
child's toy whicll, when pushed down in one place,
pops up in another. In appellant's original brief to
this Court, appellant centered its appeal on alleged
errors in the lower Court's findings. The three points
argued by appellant in the original brief were based
entirely on alleged errors in the findings. Respondent answered the appellant's brief. This occasioned
a reply by appellant in which no mention is made
of erroneous findings. The Reply Brief of appellant
is based upon the premise that an essen tia1 element
of the repondent's entitlement Ito relief is a showing
that defendant-appellant, by the use of the word "Security 'Title", created confusion resulting in damage
to the respondent. This argument was fully answered
by the Court's decision of December 31st. Nothing
daunted, the appellant tries again, this time on still
another tack; namely, th!at respondents are not en1
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titled to relief because respondents use of the words
''Security Title" is not exclusive. Appellant also urges
that to grant to respondents the protection sought, is
giving them a monopoly on the use of these words
"Security Title". Fortunately, all of these arguments were made to the lower Court, and included
with changing emphasis, as above pointed out, in
the argument on appeal before this court.
Point number 1 of the appellant's argument on
the petition for rehearing was included in point
number 1 of the Reply Brief, an'd particularly at
pages 5 and 6 thereof where the Fisk case was discussed at length and it was urged by appellant upon
the Court that, "In short, the plaintiffs, at the trial
would have had to den1onstrate that the words 'Security Title' have been used exclusively." The fact
that respondents had affiliated corporations using
the words "Security Ti tie" in Utah was not only
pointed out to this Coutt, but in the opinion filed,
this Court took official cognizance of this fact. It
was not "'overlooked" as the appellant stated in its
point number 1 of the brief for r~hearing. We cite
the Court's opinion,
"Former employees and associates of
respondents are now doing land title examinations, abstracting and acting as agents for
ti tie insurance companies in various counties
within this state as affiliates of respondents
and have been given the ri.ght b~ r~s~onden~s
tu use the words 'Secunty Title In their
nan1es."
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The Fisk case, 3 F2d 7, was argued fully to
'the Court in appell:ant's Reply Brief and in the oral
argument before this Court. It a:hd the cases cited
with it by appellant do not stand for the proposition contended for by appellant, ·as has been previously argued :at length to this Court, and nothing
new i's here presented by appellant for the Court's
consideration.
Appellant's second point in fue brief for rehearing· is nothing but a rehash of the exact point
argued as the second sub-point of point number 1
of the appellant's Reply Brief. We direct the Court's
a:tten tion to the similarity of the language in which
the two points are set out. In the Reply Brief. at
page 5, the appellant says,
"2. Even if -a secondary meaning. had
attached ·to the words 'Security Title' in favor
of the plaintiffs or either of them (assuming
such could occur) the plaintiffs would not
thereby have an exclusive monopolistic right
to· the ·use of such words, but would merely
have a right to complain of an unfair use
thereof by another.''
In the instant brief for rehearing, the point is
.set forth by appellant in this language,
·
"Contrary to well established l:aw, which
would only entitle the plaintiffs to a rig:ht.to
have a subsequent user of the words distinguish itself, this court in affirming the decision of the trial court has inadvertently
granted the plaintiffs .an unwarranted monopolistic right to the use of the words 'Security Title'."
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We submit that ·nothing new is placed before tlle
Court for consideration in this point.
Appellant, throughout the case, has been unable
or unwilling to perceive the distinction between
trademarks and the property right a corporation
has in its corporate name. The cases cited in appellant's brief on rehearing are for the most part trademark cases, some of which are dependent upon :aplication of statutes regulating the use of the trademarks for the decisions reached. They have no pertinency here. The Supreme Court of the United
States, in the case of American Steel Foundries v.
Robertson, 269 U.S. 372, 70 L.Ed. 317, marks the
distinction:
" ... There is no property in a tflademark
apart from· the business or trade in connection with which it is employed. Unite'd Drug
Co. v. Theodore Reetanus Co., 248 U.S. 90,
9'7, 63 L.ed. 141, 14·5; 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 48;
Hanover Star Mill. Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S.
403, 413, 414, 60 L.ed. 713, 718, 7'1'9, 36 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 3'5 7. ~The 1law of trademarks is but a
part of the broader law of unfair ·competi.tion' (ibid.), the general purpose of whi~h is
to prevent one person from passing ,off his
goods or his business as tilie goods or business
of another.
"Whether the name of a corporation is
to· he regarded as a trademark, a trade name,
or both, is not entirely clear under the decisions. To some extent the two terms overlap,
but there is a difference more or less definitely recognized, which is, that, generally- spe_aking, the former is applicable to .the~ ven'drble
5
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commodity to which it is affixed, the latter to
a business and its good will. See Ball v. Broadway Bazaar, 194 N.Y. 4·2'9, 434, 435, 87 N.E.
6'74. A corporate name seems to f.all more apP!Opri~tely into _the latter class. Bu~ the precise difference Is not often material, since
1fue law affords protection ~against its appropriation in either view upon the same fundamental principles. 'The effect of assuming a
·corporate name by a corporation under the
law of its creation i's to exclusively appropriate that name. It is an element of the corporation's exis'tence. Newby v. Oregon C. R. Co.,
Deady 609, 616, Fed. Cas. No. 10,144. And~
as Judge Deady said in that case:
"'Any act which produces confusion or
uncertainty concerning this name is well calculated to injuriously affect the identity and
business of :a corporation. And as a matter of
fact, in some degree at least, the natural and
necessary consequence of the wrongful appropriation of a corporate name, is to injure the
business and rights of the corporation by destroying or confusing its identity.'
"The general doctrine is that equity not
only will enjoin the appropriation and use
of a trade-mark or trade name where it is
completely identical with the name of the corporation, but will enjoin such appropriation
and use where the resembl~ance is so close as
to be likely to produce confusion as to suc~1
identity, to the injury of the corporation t~
which the name belongs. Cape May Yacht
Club v. Cape May Yacht & Country Club, 81
N. J. Eq. 4'54, 458, 86 Atl. 972; Armington
v. Palmer, 21 R.I. 109, 115, 43 L.R.A. 95, 79
Am. St. Rep. 786, 42 Atl. 308. Judicial inter6
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ference will depend upon the facts proved and
found in each case. Hendricks v. Man'tagu,
L. R. 17 Ch. Div. 638, 648-C.A.; Chas. S.
Higgins Co. v. Higgins Soap Co., 144 N.Y.
46 2, 469-4 71, 471, 27 L.R.A. 42, 4'3 Am. St.
Rep. 769, 39 N.E. 490."
1

That a corporate name is a valuable property
right of the corporation entitled to prote'ction by
the courts is recognized by Fletcher Cyclopedia of
Corporations, Volume 6, Permanent Edition, Section
2415, a:t page '7, where the author says,
''In any case it is regarded, to a certain
extent, as a property right and one which cannot be impaired or defeated by subsequent
appropriation by another corpor.ation operating in the same field . . ."
This Court, in previously rendered decisions,
has decisively declared the basis for a rehearing.
In the case of Ducheneau v. House, Sup. Ct.
of Utah July 3, 1886, 4 'U. 483, 11 P. H18, this court
said:
"The petition for rehearing states no
new facts or grounds for a reversal of the
judgment of the lower court. It is mainly areargument of the case. We have repeatedly
called attention to the fact that no rehearing
will be granted where nothing new and important is offered for our consideration. We
again say that we cannot grant a rehearing
unless a strong showing therefor be ma'de. A
re-argument, or an argument with the Court
upon the points of the decision, with no new
light given, is not such a showing. The rehearing is denied."
7
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Again in Cummings et ~tx v. Nielson, et al, 42
U. 157, 1'29 P. 619.
''We desire to 1add a word in conclusion
respecting the numerous applications for rehearings in this court. To make an application for a rehearing is a matter of right, and
we have no desire to discourage the practice
of filing petitions for rehearings in proper
cases. When this court, however, has considered and decided 'all of the material questions invdlved in a case, a rehearing should
not be applied for, unless we have misconstrued or overlooked some material fact or
facts, or have overlooked some statute or decision which may affect the result, or that
we have based the decision on some wrong
principle of law, or have either misapplied
or overlooked something which materially affects the result. In this case nothing was done
or attempted by counsel, except to re-argue
the very propositions we had fully considered
and decided. If we shoU'ld write opinions on
all the petitions for rehearings filed, we would
have to devote a very large portion of our
time in answering counsel's contentions a
second '~ime; and, if we should grant rehearings because they are demanded, we should
do nothing else save to write and rewrite
opinions in a few cases. Let it again be said
that it is 'Conceded, as a rna tter of course that
we ~annot convince losing counsel that their
contentions should not prevail, but in m!aking
this concession let it also be remembered that
we, and not counsel must ultimately assume
all responsibility with respect to whether our
conclusions are sound or unsound. Our endeavor is to determine all cases correctly upon
8
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the law and the facts, and, if we fail in this,
it is because we are incapable of arriving at

just conclusions. As a general rule, therefore,
merely to re..:argue the grounds originally presented can be of little, if any, aid to us. If
there are some reasons, however, such as we
have indi'cated above, or other good reasons, a
petition for rehearing should be promptly
filed, and if it is meri torlous, its form will
in no case be scrutinized by the Court.
"There is no merit to the present petition,
and it is, therefore, 1denied.''
As we have previously pointed out, in the present petition for rehearing, counsel for appellant,
by change of emphasis, seeks to make that which has
been extensively argued to the Court before, no\V
appear as new. This is not true and the previously
entered decision of this Court is sound, workable law
based on recognized precedent, correctly applied to
the facts.

9
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CONCLUSION
The petition for rehearing is merely an argument with the Court's decision, and presents no
basis upon which a rehearing should be granted. We
submit that the petition of appellant for rehearing
should be denied.
Res,pectful'ly submitted,
,ALLEN H. TIBBALS AND
EARL P. STATEN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs & Respondents

By --------------------------- ~--- ------------------------.---ALLAN H. TIBBALS
604 El Paso Natural Ga'S Building
3t5 East Second South Street
Salt Lake City, Utah

10
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

